Every year around Ashwin end the same conversation happens in every accounting office in Nepal: "The audit is done. The return is ready. We are just waiting for one or two confirmations." Six weeks later — mid-Poush — the same conversation continues, with the same "one or two confirmations" still missing. The public story is that Nepali businesses are slow at closing their books. The actual story is that a small clause in Anusuchi 13 — the balance-confirmation schedule attached to the annual income tax return — has become the single biggest source of avoidable filing delay in the country. And the design of that clause disproportionately hurts small taxpayers while making no material difference to compliance quality. This post lays out why, and proposes three concrete reforms.
Key takeaways
- Anusuchi 13 is the schedule where a business discloses debtors and creditors above a threshold and, in market practice, obtains signed balance-confirmation letters from each of them before filing.
- The threshold — commonly NPR 1,00,000 per party — is applied uniformly to every organisation. There is no revenue-based tiering, so a small trader and a large distributor face the same rule.
- Audits typically close by Kartik-Mangsir. What pushes filings into the Poush extension is not the audit itself — it is counterparty confirmations.
- Small taxpayers depend on large counterparties for confirmation. Large parties have no comparable penalty for delay. The extension window ends up transferring filing risk from big to small.
- The IRD's real objective is discrepancy detection, not the confirmations themselves. Three reforms — raise the threshold, narrow it to sales/purchase totals, and accept transactional evidence for disputes — would meet the objective without the market-wide friction.
What Anusuchi 13 is and how it got here
Anusuchi 13 is the schedule attached to the annual income tax return (D-01 for individuals with business income, D-03 for entities) that lists debtors and creditors above a specified threshold at year-end. The schedule requires the taxpayer to disclose party name, PAN, address, transactions during the year, and the closing balance. In market practice — and, in some circulars, formal expectation — the disclosure is supported by balance-confirmation letters from the counterparty, signed and stamped.
The origin story is defensible: if two parties record the same transaction differently, the IRD can catch it. If a supplier claims NPR 8 lakh of sales to you but you record NPR 6 lakh of purchases from them, that is a NPR 2 lakh gap worth asking about. The original intent was fraud deterrence and books-integrity. That intent is legitimate; the implementation is not calibrated.
The audit-vs-confirmation timeline
Why the audit is not the bottleneck — the real timeline of a Nepali tax filing
The green bar (audit) fits comfortably before Ashwin. The orange bar (chasing signed confirmations) is what pushes filings into the Poush extension.
The threshold problem — NPR 1 lakh across a NPR 3 crore business and a NPR 30 crore business
The NPR 1 lakh threshold does not scale with the size of the business. Consider two ordinary Kathmandu businesses:
- Business A — a NPR 3 crore-turnover retailer. It has perhaps 25–40 parties with year-end balances above NPR 1 lakh. Chasing 25–40 confirmations is painful but achievable.
- Business B — a NPR 30 crore-turnover distributor. It has 250–400 parties above NPR 1 lakh. Chasing 400 confirmations before Poush end is a project.
Both face the same NPR 1 lakh cutoff. There is no threshold-on-revenue tier. The rule that was arguably calibrated for one class of taxpayer becomes a full-time compliance function at another.
Approximate counterparty count above NPR 1 lakh — indicative Nepal SME/MSME data
Same rule, exponentially different burden. A single NPR 1 lakh cutoff is a policy stress point for businesses whose scale it was not designed for.
Power asymmetry — small taxpayer, large counterparty
Here is the deeper problem the threshold conversation misses. In the Nepali market, most business flows go from many small parties to a smaller number of large parties. A neighbourhood distributor sells to 300 small retailers and buys from three large manufacturers or importers. When the distributor tries to file its return:
- It needs signed confirmations from 300 small retailers — most of whom will sign quickly because the distributor is a big customer.
- It also needs signed confirmations from three large manufacturers — who have hundreds of similar requests and no urgency to respond.
The small parties respond because the distributor has commercial leverage. The distributor gets no such leverage over its own big suppliers. The rule effectively creates a queue where small taxpayers depend on large taxpayers to sign off on time, and large taxpayers have no comparable penalty for delay. If the large counterparty misses the December deadline, they use the extension. If the small taxpayer misses the December deadline waiting for that counterparty, they pay interest and fees.
The Anusuchi 13 requirement makes small taxpayers hostage to large counterparties' calendars. Any policy rule that has that shape needs to be examined.
Where the extension actually helps — a directional read
The extension window is symmetric in law but asymmetric in effect. Small taxpayers wait; large taxpayers work at their normal pace.
Why the Mangsir/Poush extension is a partial fix at best
The IRD's answer to the Ashwin crush has been to open a Mangsir/Poush extension window, sometimes with revenue-based tiers on when specific taxpayers must file within the window. The good news: it defuses the immediate deadline pressure. The bad news: it does not touch the underlying dependency chain. If you are a small taxpayer waiting on a confirmation from a bank, a large distributor, or a government agency, whether your deadline is 15 Ashwin or 25 Poush changes nothing about the counterparty's willingness to sign. The extension buys time; it does not redistribute leverage.
Worse, the extension has an implicit incentive baked in: large counterparties whose own filings are more comfortable in the extension window have less reason to hurry their counterparty-signature workload. The extension window becomes their queue too. Small parties chasing signatures find that "sure, we will send it before our deadline" means their own deadline, not the requester's.
The market reality — real differences, real friction
Even when both sides want to reconcile, the numbers frequently do not match — for perfectly legitimate reasons:
- Cut-off differences. A payment issued on Ashadh 32 is booked in FY 2082/83 by one party and received on Shrawan 1 by the other, booked in FY 2083/84. Same transaction, two years, two closing balances.
- Payment allocation. A single payment covers three invoices; one party allocates it against the oldest three, the other against a mix. The invoice-level ledger differs even though the total matches.
- Credit notes and returns. Sales returns booked in different months; discounts credited in different periods; sample stock not properly moved out.
- Sales tax / VAT rounding and reverse-charge treatment on cross-border services.
- Currency and rate differences on foreign transactions.
None of these signal fraud. All of them cause a NPR 1 lakh threshold letter to come back "does not match" and require a further exchange. Two honest parties, one legitimate cut-off, three additional weeks of correspondence — multiplied across every threshold-crossing party in the ledger.
And then there is the relationship cost. A small business asking a large customer for a signed balance confirmation letter — often with a demand for "your PAN certificate, VAT certificate, MOA and stamp on our letterhead" — is quietly damaging. Big customers know they can decline politely, and often do. The small business either lies (files an unsigned schedule and hopes the IRD does not ask) or files late.
What the IRD actually wants vs what the market delivers
Speak to the IRD side and the answer is consistent: we do not care about the letter, we care that the numbers are not different. In other words, the objective is discrepancy detection, not paperwork. The rule as written and enforced targets the paperwork; the objective it serves is upstream of that.
That gap — between what the IRD wants and how the rule is enforced — is where reform space exists. If discrepancy detection is the real objective, there are lower-friction ways to achieve it than requiring every NPR 1 lakh counterparty of every business to sign a letter. Which brings us to the reform.
Three concrete reforms
Three targeted reforms — from disproportionate to proportionate
Together, these reforms preserve the IRD's discrepancy-detection objective while removing the market-wide dependency chain that pushes small taxpayers into the Poush window every year.
Reform 1 — Raise the threshold from NPR 1 lakh to NPR 10 lakh (with a revenue-based tier)
A tenfold increase in the threshold is not radical — it is a return to proportion. For a NPR 3 crore business, moving from NPR 1 lakh to NPR 10 lakh cuts the counterparty list from ~25 to ~5. For a NPR 30 crore business, ~250 to ~30. Add a revenue-based tier so very large taxpayers (say, above NPR 100 crore turnover) still capture more counterparties, and the compliance burden becomes proportional to the taxpayer's actual footprint.
Reform 2 — Confirm sales and purchase totals, not closing balance
The most common source of confirmation friction — cut-off, payment allocation, credit notes — is on the balance side, not the transaction side. Two parties can easily agree on total sales for the year and still record different closing balances because of a single Ashadh 32 payment. If the disclosure is scoped to annual sales and purchase totals per party, honest differences on closing balance stop causing filing delays. Balance-sheet audit remains a separate matter under NAS 16 / NSA-ISA framework — the tax return does not need to solve it.
Reform 3 — Accept transactional evidence for disputes; make counterparty confirmation a last resort
When the IRD wants to test a suspected discrepancy, the strongest evidence is not a counterparty signature — it is the underlying transaction record: the invoice, the delivery challan, the bank statement, the e-payment reference. These are already digitally available in most cases and cannot be manufactured after the fact. Reform the practice so that:
- The default disclosure is the taxpayer's own list (party, PAN, transaction totals).
- If the IRD flags a discrepancy, the taxpayer produces transaction-level evidence in the first instance — invoices and payment records — not a counterparty letter.
- The counterparty letter is requested only when transaction evidence itself is disputed.
This preserves the IRD's discrepancy tool without making it the default. Ninety percent of returns pass without ever needing a counterparty signature, because their transaction records are clean.
Until the rule changes — a practical playbook
None of the above is happening this fiscal year. What can businesses and CAs do in the meantime?
- Start the confirmation cycle in Bhadra, not Kartik. The moment the audit fieldwork begins, send confirmation requests in parallel. Do not wait for the audit to close.
- Batch and template. Send confirmation letters in weekly batches, not one-off. A one-page template with PAN, party name, totals and a signature line reduces friction on the receiving side.
- Digital first. Email + scanned signed letter is universally accepted. Do not chase physical stamped originals unless the IRD circular for the year explicitly demands them.
- Prioritise your bottleneck relationships. Identify the 3–5 counterparties whose signature always drags. Reach out to their finance heads directly before deadline season begins.
- Document your effort. Keep a log of sent-dates, follow-ups and non-responses. If you have to file with an unsigned confirmation, the log becomes your defence.
- Use the Mangsir extension window strategically. Move your target internal deadline to Kartik-Mangsir. The Ashwin end deadline is where the fee clock starts; being ready in Ashwin gives you 60 days of buffer to chase the last few signatures without penalty exposure.
Anusuchi 13 is not the audit's problem to solve. It is a compliance workflow that has to start in Bhadra, run in parallel to fieldwork, and finish before the audit does.
Frequently asked questions
Is the confirmation letter legally mandatory or just market practice?
The disclosure schedule (Anusuchi 13) is mandatory. The signed-counterparty-letter enforcement is a mix of statute, circular, and long-standing IRD practice. Different years and different IRO offices have interpreted it differently, which is itself part of the friction. Practitioners should verify each year's practice with their assessing officer.
What happens if I file Anusuchi 13 without confirmation letters?
The return is accepted (the portal does not require letter uploads). But if the assessing officer opens a scrutiny, they will ask for confirmations. Absence of confirmation is not by itself a disallowance — you can produce alternative evidence (invoices, payment records). The risk is procedural, not substantive.
Does the small-taxpayer / large-taxpayer asymmetry work in reverse for very large taxpayers?
Rarely. A large taxpayer chasing signatures from its 300 small retailer counterparties usually gets them quickly (commercial leverage). The pain point is signatures from other large parties — banks, government suppliers, sector regulators — which everyone chases through the same queue.
What is the ICAN position on the threshold?
ICAN has periodically flagged the compliance burden in its pre-budget submissions and highlights the counterparty workload as a structural cost. A specific threshold-revision recommendation has not, to our knowledge, been formally adopted in the enacted Finance Acts of 2082 or 2083. The reform space remains open.
How does India handle similar disclosures?
India's Form 3CD (tax audit report) also requires related-party and specified-transaction disclosures, but relies more heavily on GST-linked reconciliation — GSTR-1 (outward supplies) and GSTR-2A/2B (auto-populated purchases) automate the reconciliation before it reaches the income tax return. Nepal's e-VAT system is capable of similar automation; extending it into income-tax reconciliation would eliminate much of the letter-chasing.
Getting help
The single biggest gain for a Nepali business preparing this year's filing is not "chasing harder." It is starting the confirmation cycle six weeks earlier and being ready to file in Ashwin, not Poush. If your prior year's filing landed in the Poush extension because of confirmations, this is exactly the workflow a CA can help you redesign — and, in doing so, take the Poush stress off next year's cycle.
Editorial note — this piece reflects the author's practitioner opinion on the calibration of Nepal's Anusuchi 13 balance-confirmation practice. It is not a criticism of the IRD's underlying discrepancy-detection objective, which is legitimate. The reforms proposed here are offered constructively as inputs into future Finance Act and IRD-directive consultations.